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Abstract
In 1994, Peter Shor came up with a quantum algorithm that can factor integers efficiently.
Along with the world of computations, this revolutionised the field of cryptography as one
of the most popular protocols, RSA, assumes hardness of this problem. Though no practical
quantum computers existed by then, it was evident that we are in dire need of a cryptosystem
which will remain secure even in the era of quantum computers.
Interestingly, Shor’s algorithm can be generalised, in a loose sense, to a higher class of
problems commonly refereed to as hidden subgroup problems. The hidden subgroup problem
can be stated as: given a function f over a group G that separates cosets 1 of an unknown
subgroup H, the task is to find a generating set for subgroup H in O(poly(log(G))) many
measurements and post-processing steps. The class consists of a wide range of problems
from order finding (Z/nZ) to graph isomorphism (Sn) and shotest vector problem in lattices
(D2n). One of the key ingradients of Shor’s algorithm is quantum Fourier sampling (QFS).
The succuess of the algorithm depends on how effective quantum Fourier sampling is in
the corresponding case. The algorithm uses a quantum gate known as QFT (quantum
Fourier transform) which performs the natural analogue of discrete Fourier transform over
a group. Using this QFT, the quantum Fourier sampling produces a probabilty distribution
over irreducible representations of group G (or on positions inside a matrix of represntaions
if one does strong Fourier sampling) based on cosets of f . Basic idea to solve a hidden
subgroup problem is reconstructing subgroup from obtained probability distribution. This
process is feasible in every finite abelian group but the problem is open to a large extent for
non-commutative groups. Naturally, this motivates us to look into cryptosystems where the
underlying structure is non-commutative.
McEliece cryptosystem, developed by Robert McEliece in 1978, is one such cryptosys-
tem where the underlying structure is non-commutative. McEliece cryptosystem is based on
linear algebraic codes, one of the two most promissing enviromnents for post-quantum cryp-
tography (other one being lattice based cryptography). The main advantages for McEliece
system other than possibly being quantum secure is faster speed than RSA and ElGamal.
Hence, there is a lot of interest in McEliece cryptosystem. However, most of the claim of
security does not have a proper theoretical backing. The idea to come up with a proof of
1A fuction that is constant on a coset and different on different cosets
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security for a McEliece cryptosystem was started by Dinh, Moore and Russel. The idea used
by them can be traced back to the work by Julia Kempe and Aner Shalev where they charc-
terized hidden subgroups of Sn that are distinguishable from the identity subgroup. When
two subgroups give probabilty distribution from QFS that are very close to each other then
we can not differentiate between those two and hence, hidden subgroup problem can not
be solved. Dinh, Moore and Russel extended this idea for identity subgroup and conjugate
subgroups in the corresponding group for McEliece cryptosystem with goppa codes.
Though Niederreiter cryptosytem with goppa codes is shown to be quantum secure by
Dinh, Moore and Russel, the system developed by goppa codes has two major drawbacks.
One, the key sizes are too large and two, transmission rate is small, approximately 0.52. We
extend this result to a new class of Quasi-cyclic codes of a certain kind. We show that it is
impossible that the known quantum attack, using hidden subgroup problem and quantum
Fourier sampling (or QFS) will break Niederreiter cryptosystem using a particular type of
parity check matrices. We use a result provided by Dinh, Moore and Russel for this. To our
knowledge, this is only the second variant of McEliece, after classical goppa codes, that is
quantum secure.
Our proposed system has a better transmission rate than the previous variant. In most
cases, key sizes are significantly smaller than the original variant. We also provide an algo-
rithm that generates a parity check matrices satisfying the required set of conditions.
Chapter 1 gives brief summary of definitons and concepts from coding theory and cryp-
tosystems based on algebraic coding theory. Quantum Fourier sampling and problems of
hidden subgroup, hidden shift are reviewed in chapter 2. In chapter 3, we look into a closely
related problem of combinatorial optimizaion where we are trying to find a class of QCCs
that have small automorrphism group and large enough minimal degree. For this probelm
also, we give a class of such codes and provide an algorithm that gives generator matrices for
such codes. Chapter 4 provides a Niederreiter variant that is both classically and quantum
secure.
xii
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Chapter 1
Coding Theory and Public Key
Cryptosystems
In 1978, Robert McEliece [1] came up with a cryptosystem based on algebraic coding the-
ory. The system never gained much popularity due to its large key sizes. Despite of this
major drawback, McEliece and similar cryptosystems have started to gain mathematicians’
attention as it is believed to be quantum secure. Unlike RSA or ElGamal, McEliece cryp-
tosystem is based on non-commutative structure of algebraic codes. Compared to traditional
cryptosystems, McEliece cryptosystem has following advantages
a) It is fast. Faster than RSA or ElGamal.
b) It is believed to be quantum secure.
The major problem with the McEliece cryptosystem is its large key size which makes imple-
mentation difficult.
a) Key sizes huge.
b) Cipher-text becomes much larger than the plain-text because of the redundancy added
by the encoding process.
In this chapter, we start with basic definition from coding theory. Then we describe en-
cryption and decryption processes for both McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems. Some
1
important classical attacks are reviewed and current specifications of parameters are given.
1.1 Coding Theory
Error correcting codes are broadly separated in two sections; linear codes and non linear
codes. Due to their elegant mathematical structure, linear codes received major interest
of the coding community. Traditionally, linear codes are categorized into two types; block
linear codes and convolutional codes. As every McEliece cryptosystem is based on block
linear codes, we look specifically into block linear codes. Our standard reference for coding
theory will be Blahut [2, Chapter 3]. Most of our discussions are on binary linear codes,
that is, codes over F2l for some integer l ≥ 1 but the same theory can be applied over any
finite field.
A q-ary linear code C of length n and rank k is a k dimensional linear subspace of Fnq
Definition 1.1.1. Hamming weight: Hamming weight or simply weight w of a vector v,
denoted by w(v), is defined as the number of non-zero entries in v.
The hamming weight sets up a canonical distance function over Fqn . This distance is
called the hamming distance.
Definition 1.1.2. Hamming distance dH(x, y) := w(x− y).
The distance of code C is defined as the minimum of the distance between any two distinct
codewords in C. We denote this by d(C) or simply d if code C is clear from the context.
d(C) = min
x,y∈C,x 6=y
dH(x, y)
.
Traditionally, such a code is denoted as [n, k, d] Following is an easy lemma, proof of
which can be found in any standard text such as [3, 4].
Lemma 1.1.1. Let C be a linear code then
d(C) = min
x∈C,x 6=0
w(x)
2
One of the important parameters of a code is its error correction capacity.
Definition 1.1.3. Error correction capacity t : Let C be [n, k, d] code. Then the error
correcting capacity is the largest integer t such that for any y ∈ Fnq there exists a unique
c ∈ C such that dH(y, c) ≤ t. The ratio tn is known as the error correction rate of the code C.
Error correction capacity and the minimum distance of a code are related to each other
by an obvious relation t =
⌊
d(C)− 1
2
⌋
.
A natural way to construct this k dimensional space C is by viewing it as a range space
of some k × n matrix G known as the generator matrix of the code C and we say that G
generates code C. Alternatively, C can be constructed by kernel space of some matrix H of
size (n− k)×n. In such cases H is known as the parity check matrix. Of course, for a given
code C there are many generator matrices and there are many parity check matrices. Code
generated by H is known as the dual code of C and is denoted as C⊥. Note that both G and
H are full rank matrices.
It is easy to check that GHT = 0. Also dual of the dual is the same code,that is,(C⊥)⊥ = C. So another way to define dual code is as follows:
Definition 1.1.4. Dual code C⊥ : Let C be a linear [n, k] code over Fq then its [n, n− k]
dual C⊥ is defined as
C⊥ = {y ∈ Fnq such that for all x ∈ C 〈x, y〉 = 0} where 〈x, y〉 denotes inner product of x
and y over Fq.
Now we give a few examples of codes.
(I) Hadamard Code [n = 2r, k = r, d = 2r−1] :
Hadamard Code is a linear code generated from a generator matrix whose ith column
is the number i written as a binary expression in r bits. Thus, there are 2r columns
corresponding to all binary numbers with r bits. The code has minimum distance
d = 2r−1 and hence can correct roughly about t = 2r−2 errors.
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eg. G =
 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 10 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1

(II) Binary Goppa Codes [n, k, 2t+ 1] :
Construction of a binary Goppa code is done with a polynomial g(x) of degree t over a
finite field F2m of characteristic 2 without multiple zeros. Then construction of binary
Goppa codes is done in the following way
Pick a set of n-points {p1, p2, . . . , pn : pi ∈ F2m , g(pi) 6= 0} i.e. none of the p′is are
a root of the polynomial g(x). Then parity check matrix for corresponding code is a
product of two matrices; first one is a vandermonde matrix and the second one is a
diagonal matrix. Construct following matrices V and D
V =

1 1 · · · 1
p1 p2 · · · pn
p21 p
2
2 · · · p2n
...
...
. . .
...
pt−11 p
t−1
2 · · · pt−1n

D =

1
g(p1)
0 · · · 0
0 1
g(p2)
· · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 1
g(pn)

H = V D.
Binary Goppa codes are the codes used in the original McEliece cryptosystems.
(III) Cyclic Codes:
Let a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) be an element of Fnq then we define the right shift of a as
(an, a1, . . . , an−1). A linear code is called a cyclic code if it is closed under right shifts.
Cyclic codes have a nice algebraic structure. The code can be considered as an ideal
in the polynomial ring R = Fq[x]/(xn − 1) which is a PID. In this ring multiplication
by x to a codeword c results into a right shift of c. Being an ideal, the code space can
be generated by a single polynomial g(x), known as generator polynomial of the code.
(IV ) Quasi Cyclic Codes (QCCs) [n = m1p, k = m2p, d]: Quasi-cyclic code is a simple gen-
eralization of a cyclic code. A linear code is considered from a class of quasi-cyclic
codes if there exists an integer m such that code is closed under m right shifts. That
is, if we denote R as a right shift operator then for all c ∈ QCC we have Rn(c) ∈ QCC.
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Such lowest m for which the code is closed under m right shifts is known as the index
of the code. For cyclic codes, we have m = 1. QCCs can be constructed by generator
matrices whose every block is a circulant matrix of size p and the number of such
blocks in a particular row indicates its index. Similar to cyclic code , QCCs also have
a nice algebraic structure. We will come back to QCCs later to talk in detail as our
both variants are built over QCCs.
Consider a communication where we want a k-bit message m = (b1, b2, . . . , bk). Now when
we send this over a channel, there is a possibility that some bi gets corrupted to b
′
i. Notice
that such corrupted vector is also a possible message that one could intend to send. Hence
the receiver receives a wrong message. To overcome this difficulty, we add redundancy to the
message eg. repeating the message bits thrice, i.e, for message m = (b1, b2, . . . , bk) of k-bits
we instead send a message of 3k-bits m′ = (b1, b1, b1, b2, b2, b2, . . . , bk, bk, bk). Such codes are
known as repetition codes. So even if some bit bi gets corrupted to b
′
i at one particular
position, we have two other copies to recover the original message m. 1 In practice, much
larger numbers than 3 are used. It is highly unlikely that the exact same corruption happens
at multiple places.
This process of adding redundancies before sending a message is known as the encoding
of an error correcting code. The process for a general linear error correcting code can be
implemented as follows: Suppose we want to send messages of k-bits. So we have a message
space of dimension k over Fq. We embed this space into much higher dimensional space, say
of dimension n, over Fq. One of the ways this can be done is by using a compatible linear
map G of full rank.
ϕG : Fkq −→ Fnq
x 7→ xG
The map has a k-dimensional range with trivial kernel. As one might guess, our generator
matrix G can be used as a linear map. The domain of the map ϕG is known as the message
space while the range is known as the code space. This process is known as encoding and
the map ϕG is known as the encoding function.
1Note that corrupted message is not in the possible sample set for receiver since theoretically receiver
expects vectors with some particular pattern, namely each partition of 3-components has same element
throughout the partition.
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Once received, the vector from Fnq has to be converted back to the original message vector
in Fkq . This is done by the process known as decoding. A decoding process is a two step
process. Usually, the first step consists of finding the nearest codeword to the received vector.
And the second step is obtaining the message from this codeword. The second step can be
done using common routines from linear algebra such as Gaussian elimination and generally
is not a difficult task.
ψ : Fnq
ψ1−→ C ψ2−→ Fkq
where ψ1(x) 7→ c such that for all c′ ∈ C, dH(x, c′) > dH(x, c)
and ψ2 is an inverse of ϕG when restricted on C.
Here, e = x − c is known as the error and process of computing c from x, denoted by ψ1
above is called the error correction. As this is the hardest computation in ψ, sometimes,
ψ1 is also referred as decoding of a linear code. This process of decoding is not easy for a
random linear code. The problem of decoding a random linear code is known as the general
decoding problem and is NP-complete [5]. But there are some codes for which this can be
done easily eg. RS codes, Binary Goppa codes, cyclic codes, some subclasses of QCCs. Such
codes are called decodable codes and it is said that they have a decoder.
1.2 Public Key cryptosystems based on coding theory
Using this hardness of the general decoding problem, Robert McEliece [1] proposed a cryp-
tosystem based on algebraic coding theory. Later Niederreiter proposed his knapsack like
variant based on the same principle. The rough idea behind both the systems can be ex-
plained as below :
Take a code C which has a good decoding algorithm. Transform this code into a new
code C ′ with no apparent structure. A sender sends message using code C ′. Now as the code
C ′ has no visible structure it is as good as a random linear code and no one can decode it.
As you are the one who generated the system you have the transformation from C to C ′ you
can revert the transformation and work in the frame of C and then decode successfully as C
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has a good decoder. Again, an eavesdropper can not decode this as he does not have a way
to transform the system from C ′ to C.
Now we move into McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems. We first explain there
encryption and decryption algorithms and classical security. We address the question of
quantum security in the chapter 2.
1.2.1 Description of the McEliece cryptosystem
Let M be a generator matrix for a [n, k] linear code C for which a fast decoding algorithm
exists. Let E be the number of errors that C can correct.
Private Key: (S,M ,P ) where S ∈ GLk(F2) and P is a n× n permutation matrix.
Public Key: M ′ = SMP .
Encryption:
Let p ∈ Fkq be a k-bit plain-text. Corresponding cipher-text c ∈ Fnq is obtained by calculating
c = pM ′ + e where e is a random error vector such that wt(e) ≤ E .
Decryption:
Received cipher-text c is decrypted in the following way:
Multiplying c by P−1 we obtain cP−1 = (pM ′ + e)P−1 = (pSMP + e)P−1 = pSM + e2.
Note that e2 has same weight as e.
Now use the decoding algorithm for M on vector SAM + e2 to obtain pS.
Multiply by S−1 to recover plain-text p.
A brief explanation for security :
Consider a communication where Alice wants to send a message to Bob. Similar to any
public key cryptosystem, Bob generates his private key and computes its public counterpart.
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Private key consists of three matrices S,M, P with M having a good decoder. The private
key has a corresponding public key M ′. Since our S and P are chosen randomly, the resulting
matrix M ′ is also a random matrix with no structure and hence no efficient decoding with M ′
is possible. Clearly, every process in decryption is trivial for Bob and he can decrypt easily.
An eavesdropper, however, can not do this because he has no good decoding algorithm for
publicly known matrix M ′ and he does not have knowledge of S and P which is essential.
Another interesting question regrading security of the system is, ’what happens if M is
known ?’ The problem is same as finding transformation (S, P ) between two codes. It is
believed that this problem is not easy to solve. Decision version of this, that is, finding if two
codes are equivalent is NP-hard and graph isomorphism problem can be reduced to it; so, if
one solves the code equivalence problem, one of the problems that received the most attention
in last few decades by theoretical computer science community can be solved efficiently [6].
This problem of finding transformation between codes or generator matrices of equivalent
codes remains intractable. But this presents a possible window of attack from a quantum
computer as this transformation problem, known as scrambler-permutation problem, can
be modelled as a hidden shift problem and further can be reduced to a hidden subgroup
problem where quantum Fourier sampling can come into play. Thus, it becomes essential to
make sure that McEliece or its variants resist this quantum Fourier sampling attack.
1.2.2 Niederreiter Cryptosystem
Let H be a (n − k) × n parity matrix for a [n,k] linear code C for which a fast decoding
algorithm exists. Let E be the number of errors that C can correct.
Private Key: (S,H,P ) where S ∈ GLk(F2) and P is a permutation matrix of size n.
Public Key: H ′ = SHP .
Encryption:
Let p be a n-bit plain-text with weight at most E . Corresponding cipher-text c of n − k
bits is obtained by calculating c = H ′pT .
Decryption:
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Compute y = S−1c. Thus y = HPpT .
By linear algebra find a z such that HzT = y. As y = HPpT we have z − pP T ∈ C.
Now use fast decoding on z with H to get pP T and thus recover p.
1.2.3 Signature scheme
Initially it was thought that McEliece cryptosystem could not accommodate for signature
scheme as it is not a commutative cryptosystem in the sense that order or role of encryption
and decryption algorithms can not be altered. In other cryptosystems such as RSA, where
encryption and decryption algorithms do commute, ready signature schemes are available.
Later, in 2001, Courtois, Finiasz and Sendrier [7] came up with a signature scheme for
Niederreiter cryptosystem.
1.3 Classical attacks
In this section we briefly go over the generic classical attacks. Most of the attacks are local
attacks in the sense that they try to decrypt a given ciphertext. Complete breaks that
completely recover private keys are extremely demanding and not possible.
The attacks trying to recover plaintext from the knowledge of ciphertext and public key
are really hard due to the general decoding problem and are out of the discussion. Most
of the classical attacks that stand a chance come under category called Information Set
Decoding (ISD). There are two popular ISD attacks; one by Stern [8] and other by Lee and
Brickell [9]. As mentioned in [10], ISD attacks are the best known classical attacks and
hence considered as security level of the system.
One of the basic attacks was suggested by McEliece [1]. Lee and Brickell improved
his attack and added an important verification step where attacker can confirm whether
recovered message is the correct one. The strategy is based on repeatedly selecting k bits at
random from an n-bit cipher-text in hope that none of the selected bits are part of the error.
Similar attacks can also be implemented over Niederreiter cryptosystems. Lee and Brickell
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also provided a closed-form equation for complexity of the attack. The work factor for this
attack can be given as
Wj = Tj (αk
3 +Njβk) where,
Tj =
1
i=j∑
i=0
(
t
i
)(
n−t
k−i
)(
n
k
) and Nj =
i=j∑
i=o
(
k
i
)
Other attack is by Stern [8]. The basic idea behind this attack is to recover intentional
vector by embedding public code space into some higher dimensional codespace. Let C ′ be
the code generated by public key G′ then Stern constructs a code given by generator matrix
G′′ =
[
G′
x
]
. Bernstein, Lange and Peters [11] improved the attack using Markov Chain
Modelling. This modified version of attack made the attack faster by a factor of 212 and
parameters for the system had to be readjusted.
For a given code, both McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystem have same security [12]
on the equation level. That means, if one tries to recover plain-text from cipher-text for a
McEliece cryptosystem it is hard as doing the same for Niederreiter cryptosystem and hence
ISD attacks have same strength when applied on McEliece or Niederreiter over a code with
same parameters. Li, Deng and Wang [12] also analyzed both the systems under the attack
by Lee and Brickell.
1.3.1 Parameters
Robert McEliece in his original work suggested parameters n = 1024, k = 524, t = 50. As
mentioned before, after [11] these parameters were not secure. Bernstein suggested some
new sets of parameters. We mention a few of them here.
(a) For Goppa codes and 80 bit security n = 1632, k = 1269, t = 33. The public key size in
this case is 460647 bits.
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(b) Without list decoding suggested set is n = 2048, k = 1751, t = 27. The public key size
in this case is 520047 bits
(c) For 128-bit security n = 2960, k = 2288, t = 56. This parameter selection leads to
public keys of size 1537536 bits.
From these parameter choices it is very clear that McEliece cryptosystem or its Niederreiter
variant suffers two major drawbacks:
(I) Large public key sizes.
(II) Low transmission rate or encryption rate.
Various attempts have been made to overcome above problems but most of them turned
out to be insecure. McEliece variants over Quasi-cyclic circulant codes [10] is one of the
notable attempts in that direction. In this particular version, authors looked at QC-LDPC
codes and put forth a cryptosystem which is similar to the McEliece cryptosystem with
matrices S and P replaced by block circulant matrices. Though in this variant shorter key
structure is possible and higher encryption rates can be achieved, one of the most important
piece of the puzzle, quantum security of this variant is still missing. It is absolutely essential
that if McEliece or its any variant were to replace any of the current popular systems such
as RSA, ElGamal first priority should be its quantum security than key sizes and encryption
rate.
In next few chapters we will look into quantum security of McEliece-type cryptosystems
and then provide a Niederreiter variant that is quantum secure having high transmission
rate. We also present a brief comparative analysis of key sizes and encryption rate to original
McEliece cryptosystems.
11
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Chapter 2
Quantum Fourier Sampling
In this chapter, we look at basics of quantum Fourier sampling. We begin by defining a
problem in abelian group theory.
Problem 2.0.1. Let f be a function from Z/NZ to Z/NZ defined as
f(x) : Z/NZ 7−→ Z/NZ
for some constant a ∈ (Z/NZ)×
x 7→ ax .
We want to find period the of f(x).
Classically, it is well known that this problem is very hard. Integer factorization problem
can be reduced to above order finding problem and hence one can solve integer factorization
problem by solving order finding problem. However, with quantum computer this problem
can be efficiently solved. The algorithm that solves this problem was given by Shor [13] [14]
in 1995. This algorithm is the first quantum algorithm for some practical problem. Before
Shor’s algorithm, there were a few interesting algorithms that showed glimpses of the power
of a quantum computer [15] [16] but these problems have artificial flavor in them and have
hardly little practical importance.
Shor’s algorithm was a great boost to algorithmic computer science in itself. Along
with solving an important question for cyclic groups this algorithm opened doors for much
powerful mathematics. Naturally, this situation presented two questions in front of computer
science community. One, can we solve this order finding problem in a more general setting,
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say an abelian group or more generally in any group and two, if we were to extend this order
finding function to some class of functions what would be right choice for the problem and
will we be able to solve this problem?
Interestingly, both the questions have a common answer, quantum Fourier Sampling
(QFS). In some sense, QFS can be viewed as a general form of Shor’s algorithm. Quantum
Fourier Sampling is an important tool that acts behind the scene for almost all known
quantum algorithms that offer exponential speed up compared to classical algorithms. It is
the reason why Shor’s and Simon’s algorithms work. The order finding problem is a special
case of what is known as a hidden subgroup problem.
2.1 The Hidden Subgroup Problem (HSP)
Definition 2.1.1. Hidden Subgroup Problem: Let G be a group and f a function from G to
a set X. We know that f(g0) = f(g1) if and only if g0H = g1H for some subgroup H. The
problem is, given f find a generating set for the unknown subgroup1 H.
In particular, Shor’s algorithm is a hidden subgroup problem over Z/NZ with function
f(x) = ax. In this case hidden subgroup is H = 〈r〉 where r is the order of a in (Z/NZ)×.
Quantum Fourier Sampling is an algorithm which uses Quantum Fourier Transform as
a building block. Before going into QFS we recall some of the facts form representation
theory. Given a group G a matrix representation is a homomorphism ρ : G −→ GLdρ (C)
where GLd (C) is a space of d× d matrices over complex numbers. We denote set of all the
irreducible representations of the group G by Ĝ. So for every ρ ∈ Ĝ and every g ∈ G; ρ(g)
gives us a dρ ×dρ matrix and ρ(i,j)(g) will denote the the entry in ith row and jth column of
ρ(g). We stick only to finite groups and their complex irreducible representations. One of the
very well known result from representation theory of finite groups states that
∑
ρ dρ
2 = |G|.
Let |G| = N . Fix an ordering (g1, g2, . . . , gN) on elements of G. For a vector in CN , a
1The function f in the hidden subgroup problem is said to be separating cosets of H as f is constant on
a each coset and different on different cosets.
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general normalized state in basis B1 = {gi; 1 6 i 6 N} can be described as
|ψ〉 =
N∑
i=1
αi|gi〉 where αis are complex numbers such that
N∑
i=1
|αi|2 = 1.
Now consider another basis for CN given by B2 = {(ρ, i, j) ρ ∈ Ĝ, 1 6 i, j 6 dρ}. Clearly,
|B2| = N as
∑
ρ d
2
ρ = N . A general normalized state in basis B2 is denoted as
|ψ〉 =
∑
ρ,i,j
βρ,i,j|ρ, i, j〉 where β′ρ,i,js are complex numbers such that
∑
ρ,i,j
|βρ,i,j|2 = 1.
A quantum Fourier transform is a map that takes a normalized state in basis B1 to a normal-
ized state in B2. Under this map the vector associated with g is
∑
ρ,i,j
√
dρ√|G|ρ(i,j)(g)|ρ, i, j〉.
Quantum Fourier transform can be viewed as C linear extension of the above association.
Precisely, quantum Fourier transform on a general normalized state ψ =
∑
l αl|gl〉 in basis
B1 would give
QFT |ψ〉 =
∑
l
αl QFT |gl〉 =
∑
l
αl
∑
ρ,i,j
√
dρ√|G|ρ(i,j)(g)|ρ, i, j〉.
Measurement is a nonlinear operator used in almost every quantum algorithm. Measure-
ment operator is defined with respect to a basis. Here we describe measurement with respect
to an orthonormal basis only as both B1 and B2 described above form an orthonormal basis.
For measurement in a general basis or more general measurement operator see [17], [18].
Consider an orthonormal basis for n dimensional space B = {b1, b2, . . . bn}. Then a normal-
ized general state in this basis can be represented by |ψ〉 = ∑i βi|bi〉. Measurement on state
|ψ〉 gives bi as its output with probability |βi|2. In other words, after measurement the state
collapses to one of the basis element states; the probability that it falls on a particular state
depends on coefficient of that basis element in the state before measurement.
After this short background on quantum computing, we are ready to describe quantum
Fourier sampling. For further reading a reader can refer to [18, 20]
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Algorithm 1 Quantum Fourier Sampling (QFS)
1: procedure QFS(G, f) . QFS over group G with function f
2: |ψ〉 = ∑g |g, 0〉
3: apply Uf on |ψ〉 Let |ψ2〉 = Uf |ψ〉
. Uf is a two state unitary operator such that Uf |x, y〉 = |x, y ⊕ f(x)〉
4: Measure in the second component to get |ψ3〉
. Measurement of vector |φ〉 = ∑i αi|ei〉 gives output ei with probability |αi|2
5: Apply QFT on first component of |ψ3〉
6: Measure |ρ, i, j〉 for strong Fourier sampling OR
Measure |ρ〉 component for weak Fourier sampling
7: end procedure
Strong quantum Fourier sampling gives you output |ρ, i, j〉 for hidden subgroup H with
probability given by
PH (|ρ, i, j〉) = 1|G|
∑
g∈G
PgH (|ρ, i, j〉)
where
PgH =
dρ
|G||H|
∣∣∣∣∣∑
h∈H
ρi,j (gH)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
Details about quantum Fourier sampling and in general status about non-abelian hidden
subgroup problem can be found in [19]. For basics of quantum computation and quantum
Fourier sampling specifically from hidden subgroup point of view we refer [20]. For more
broader view of quantum computation reader can use standard texts such as [17], [18].
The rough idea behind using this QFS to solve a hidden subgroup problem is to try and
reconstruct H from PH. We make this idea precise in next few sections. But before going
there, let us briefly look at how hidden subgroup problem can be used to break McEliece
cryptosystem or its variants. We define scrambler - permutation problem.
2.2 McEliece-type Cryptosystems and HSP
Problem 2.2.1. Scrambler - Permutation Problem: Consider two k × n matrices M and
M ′ over Fql. It is known that they are related by equation M ′ = SMP for some unknown
S ∈ GLk(Fq) and some unknown permutation matrix P of size n. The problem is to find S
and P .
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Clearly, one of the ways to attack McEliece or Niederreiter cryptosystem is by solving
the scrambler-permutation problem. For this attack, we assume attacker knows both M
and M ′ and he is trying to recover remaining part of the private key. This attack is known
as the scrambler - permutation attack. As far as the quantum attacks go, this is the only
known way of attacking a McEliece cryptosystem. This structural attack is exactly same
for a McEliece cryptosystem or a Niederreiter cryptosystem except that instead of finding
a scrambler-permutation pair from generator matrix G to G′ one has to find scrambler-
permutation pair from parity check matrix H to H ′. The algebraic structure of the problem
remains the same. So, we present it in general form, to find a scrambler-permutation pair
from a k×n matrix M to other k×n matrix M ′ keeping in mind M = G and M ′ = G′ in case
of McEliece while M = H and M ′ = H ′ in case of Niederreiter. To mean either a McEliece
or a Niederreiter cryptosystem we use a broad term McEliece-type cryptosystems. In this
attack, we assume M and M ′ known, the attack is to find A and B such that AMB = M ′
with A and B coming form groups as defined before. Notice finding any A′ and B′ such that
A′MB′ = M ′ will also make the attack successful.
Problem 2.2.2 (Hidden Shift Problem). Let G be a group. Let f0 and f1 be two functions
from group G to a set X. Given f0(g) = f1(g0g) for some unknown constant g0 the task is
to find a constant g0 ∈ G. Note that there can be many g0 that satisfy the above condition.
Hidden shift problem asks us to find any one of those constants.
Let M ′ = AMP . A McEliece-type cryptosystem will be broken if we find one possible
pair (A,P ) from M and M ′. Consider two functions from group G = GLk(F2) × Sn given
by
f0(A,P ) = A
−1MP (2.1)
f1(A,P ) = A
−1M ′P (2.2)
Then one can check that f1(A,P ) = f0((A
−1
0 , P0).(A,P )), that is (A
−1
0 , P0) is the shift
between f0 and f1. Hence, if one can solve the hidden shift problem over G = GLk(F2)×Sn
he can break the McEliece-type cryptosystem.
The general procedure to solve this hidden shift problem is to reduce it to try and reduce
it to a hidden subgroup problem. We can reduce the hidden shift problem with functionsf0
and f1 defined above on the group G = GLk(F2)× Sn to the hidden subgroup problem over
(G×G)o Z2 [21, Section 2.2]. The hidden subgroup in this case is
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K = (((H0, s
−1H0s), 0) ∪ ((H0s, s−1H0), 1)) (2.3)
where H0 = {(A,P ) ∈ GLk(F2)× Sn : A−1MP = M} and s is a shift from f0 to f1.
In short, the scrambler-permutation problem is one of the key ways to attack a McEliece-
type cryptosystems. This problem can be formulated as a hidden shift problem which further
can be reduced to a hidden subgroup problem. So we can attack McEliece type cryptosystems
by trying to solve a hidden subgroup problem over (G×G)o Z2 with G = GLk(F2)× Sn.
2.3 Successful Quantum Fourier Sampling
In the previous section we saw that solving the hidden subgroup problem as a standard way
to attack the a McEliece-type cryptosystem. An interesting question is, when is the hidden
subgroup problem hard to solve? This way we can ensure the security of a McEliece-type
cryptosystem against known quantum attacks.
We briefly sketch thought behind effectiveness of QFS. Algorithm of QFS in a general
scenario and its use for solving a hidden subgroup problem is very well explained in [19].
Arguments particular to McEliece-type cryptosystems and corresponding hidden subgroup
problem are in [21]. The standard model of QFS yields a probability distribution as a
function of the hidden subgroup. The basic idea here is if two subgroups H1 and H2 yield
probability distributions PH1 and PH2 such that PH1 and PH2 are very close to each other
then QFS will not give us enough information to solve the hidden subgroup problem. The
concept of closeness of two probability distributions can be captured by setting up a norm on
the space of probability functions. To our knowledge, J. Kempe and A. Shalev [22] were the
first to introduce this beautiful idea. They used total variation norm. So, if two probability
functions have total variation distance between them less than or equal to log−ω(1)|G| then
we say that those two distributions are non-distinguishable. Using this definition, they
provided a necessary condition to distinguish a subgroup of Sn from the trivial subgroup 〈e〉.
Later Dinh, Moore and Russel [21] extended this result with keeping McEliece-type group
structure under consideration. Their result can be viewed as an analysis of a hidden subgroup
problem over the group G = (GLk(F2) × Sn)2 o Z2, the group structure for McEliece-type
cryptosystems. Instead of using total variation distance, they use L1 distance. Other key
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difference that can be considered between two definitions is Kempe and Shalev defined it for
weak Fourier sampling while Dinh, Moore and Russel defined it for strong Fourier sampling.
Also to account for all the conjugate subgroups Dinh, Moore and Russel took expectation over
all the conjugate subgroups along with expectation over irreducible complex representations
of group G denoted as ρ. Here they demonstrate a case when the hidden subgroup H can
not be distinguished from either its conjugate subgroups gHg−1 or the trivial subgroup 〈e〉.
First note that weak Fourier sampling gives same distributions for all the conjugate
subgroups that is PH is same as PgHg−1 . Hence weak Fourier sampling can not differenti-
ate a subgroup from its conjugate subgroup and thus it suffices to look at strong Fourier
sampling. Dinh, Moore and Russel [21], inspired from J. Kempe and A. Shalev [22] define
distinguishability of a subgroup H by strong Fourier sampling.
Definition 2.3.1. Distinguishability of a subgroup on strong QFS
DH := Eρ,g‖PgHg−1(·|ρ)− P〈e〉(·|ρ)‖1
A subgroup H is called indistinguishable by strong Fourier sampling if DH ≤ log−ω(1)|G|.
The realDH is nothing but the expectation of L1 distance between probability distribution
of conjugate subgroups and the trivial subgroup.
Note that if a subgroup H is indistinguishable according to this definition then by
Markov’s inequality for all c, ‖PgHg−1(·|ρ) − P{e}(·|ρ)‖t.v. ≤ log−c|G|; which is analogous
to definition provided by J. Kempe and A. Shalev [22] for indistinguishability of a subgroup
by weak Fourier sampling.
Now we state a few definitions which will be used to establish quantum security of
McEliece-type cryptosystem.
Definition 2.3.2. Aut(M) = {P ∈ Sn such that there exists A ∈ GLk(Fq), AMP = M}.
Definition 2.3.3. The minimal degree of a G 6 Sn acting on set of n symbols is defined to
be minimum number of elements moved by a non-identity element of the group G.
Definition 2.3.4. Consider a k × n matrix M , we define TM for matrix M = [Ik|M∗] as
TM = {P1 ∈ Sk such that there exists P2 ∈ Sn−k with P1M∗P2 = M∗ }.
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Theorem 2.3.1. [21, Theorem 4]: Assume qk
2 6 nan for some constant 0 < a < 1/4. Let
m be the minimal degree of the automorphism group Aut(M). Then for sufficiently large n,
the subgroup K, DK 6 O(|K|2e−δm), where δ > 0 is a constant.
In the above theorem, the subgroup K is the hidden subgroup for McEliece-type cryp-
tosystems that we stated earlier in this chapter. Details of the proof can be found in [21].
For a matrix M of full column rank, |K| = 2|Aut(M)|2 [21]. Hence if |Aut(M)|4e−δm ≤
log−ω(1)|G| then K is indistinguishable making scrambler-permutation attack using QFS in-
feasible. Thus if a k × n matrix M with minimal degree m is such that |Aut(M)|4e−δm ≤
log−ω(1)|G| then we can not find a scrambler-permutation pair and hence system remains
secure against quantum Fourier sampling.Later we use this result for parity check matrix H
to show that our Niederreiter cryptosystem is secure against this hidden subgroup attack.
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Chapter 3
A McEliece Variant
In this chapter, we describe a new variant of McEliece cryptosystem based on quasi-cyclic
codes. We then show that these codes have small automorphism group and large minimal
degree. Due to a Dinhtheorem by Dinh, Moore and Russell [21], that we looked at in the
previous chapter, it becomes a natural direction to look for codes having automorphism
groups with small size and large minimal degree. We would like to point out that our system
is not necessarily quantum secure as it does not follow the require condition for theorem to
hold, that is, qk
2 6 nαn for some 0 < α < 1/4. Though our system is not necessarily quantum
secure, it presents an interesting mathematical problem of combinatorial optimization where
we are looking to reduce the automorphism group size and increase the minimal degree.
Quasi-cyclic codes represent an important class of block linear codes and particularly, m−1
m
quasi-cyclic codes and 1
m
codes have received some special attention [23]. So, it becomes
an important question if we can set up McEliece variant based on these quasi-cyclic codes
satisfying required bounds on automorphism group size and minimal degree. Apart from,
mathematical interests, this variant has encryption rate much higher than original McEliece.
We show such construction over codes of rate m−1
m
and then note that similar construction
can be used to construct 1
m
codes. In the next chapter, we provide a similar construction of
a Niederreiter variant which is indeed quantum secure.
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3.1 Quasi-Cyclic Codes
Definition 3.1.1. Cyclic code: A code C is called a cyclic code if it is closed under right
shifts i.e. for all c = (c0, c1, c2, . . . , cn−1) ∈ C we have c′ = (cn, c0, c1, . . . , cn−1) ∈ C.
A quasi-cyclic code (QCC), a simple generalization of the cyclic code, is such that any
cyclic shift of a codeword by m symbols gives another codeword of QCC. If m = 1 the code
is a cyclic code. We are particularly interested in m−1
m
rate codes. More specifically, our
system is based on m−1
m
rate codes over F2 in this chapter and over F2l in the next chapter.
Such codes along with Quasi-cyclic codes of rate 1
m
are studied in great detail in [23].
Definition 3.1.2. Circulant matrix: A p×p matrix C is called circulant if every row, except
for the first row, is a circular right shift of the row above that.
A typical example of a circulant matrix is

c0 c1 · · · cp−1
cp−1 c0 · · · cp−2
...
...
. . .
...
c1 c2 · · · c0

Now we state a couple of relevant results about circulant matrices and cyclotomic poly-
nomials. Each lemma is easy to check involving basic ring definitions and Chinese remainder
theorem for rings so proofs are skipped.
Lemma 3.1.1. Let Cn denote class of all circulant matrices of size n. The class Cn forms a
commutative ring under usual matrix addition and multiplication.
Lemma 3.1.2. The Ring Cn is isomorphic to the ring Fq [x](xn−1) . Furthermore if n is prime and
p 6= q then this isomorphism decomposes as
Cp ∼−→ Fq [x]
(x− 1) ×
Fq [x]
Φp(x)
where Φp(x) is p
th cyclotomic polynomial.
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A rate m−1
m
systematic Quasi-Cyclic code has an p×mp parity check matrix of the form
H = [Ip|C1|C2| · · · |Cm−1] where each Ci is a circulant matrix of size p and Ip is identity
matrix of size p. For compactness we denote this as H = [I|C] with keeping in mind that C
is an array of circulants and we denote C =Array[C1, C2, . . . , Cm−1]. Alternatively, these
codes can be defined using generator matrices [24]. In this case, generator matrix takes the
following form:
G =
 I
C ′1
C ′2
...
C ′m−1

Again for compactness we denote this as G = [I|C] with understanding that C is a stack of
circulants and we denote C as C =Stack[C ′1, C ′2, . . . , C ′m−1].
In a recent work [24] a way to generate generator matrices for such codes over F2 is pre-
sented. Since these generator matrices are in systematic form one can easily construct parity
check matrix from generator matrix. Regarding the codes over extension fields [23, chap-
ter 6] shows that Quasi-cyclic codes over extension fields can be MDS (maximum distance
separable) codes. As the name suggest MDS codes can achieve large minimum distance and
hence no low weight codewords. This plays an important role for classical security of the
system against classical attacks such as Stern’s attack and Lee-Brickell attack. Though [23]
presents examples of MDS codes with rate 1
m
, this does present a case for study quasi-cyclic
codes of rate m−1
m
with large minimum distance. For more details about quasi-cyclic codes a
reader can refer to [23, 24].
3.1.1 Decoding
Quasi-cyclic codes are well studied and well established codes and depending on how one
constructs them there are various decoders available. We briefly mention some of them here.
[23, Appendix B] presents some ML (majority logic) decodable QCCs. Another new and
interesting way of decoding quasi-cyclic codes using Gro¨bner basis formulation can be found
in [25].
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3.2 Our McEliece variant
Now we are ready to describe our McEliece variant over quasi-cyclic codes of rate m−1
m
. Our
McEliece variant over F2 has a generator matrixM = [I|C] with C =Stack[C1, C2, . . . , Cm−1]
satisfying following conditions:
(I) Size of each circulant is a prime p, i.e., each circulant is a p× p matrix for some prime p.
(II) At least one of the Cis is invertible i.e. there exists i < m suth that Ci ∈ GLp(F2).
(III) Given any two columns ci0 , ci1 of C, there is at most one index j with ci0 [j] = ci1 [j] = 1;
that is, both the columns can have non-zero entry simultaneously at maximum one
position. Some authors refer to this condition as no more than one overlapping 1s.
(IV ) Let t be the weight of a column of C and tr be a weight of a row of C then t · tr 6 p−1.
Now we prove bounds on Aut(M) and minimal degree using a sequence of lemmas. First
we just point out some relation between columns of matrices.
Let P ∈ Aut(M) then for some A we have A [I|C]P = [A|AC]P = [I|C]. Hence, [A|AC]
have same set of columns as [I|C] possibly in different order.
Remark 3.2.1. Every column of A and AC is either a column of C or a column of I. Also
no column of A is same as column of AC, in fact, no two columns of [A|AC] are identical.
Assume for the whole discussion that every column of C has weight t.
Lemma 3.2.1. Let {v1, v2, . . . , vt} be set of t distinct columns where each vi comes either
from I or from C such that at least 2 columns are from C then Σti=1vi is of weight at least 2.
Proof. Suppose v1, v2 are from C. Hence v1 + v2 has weight at least 2t − 2 from condition
(III) on C (as at most one entry from each column can get converted to 0). Now each of the
remaining t − 2 columns v3, v4, . . . , vt can reduce the weight by at most 2 as it can reduce
weight of v1 by at most 1 and weight of v2 by at most 1. Thus weight of Σ
t
i=1vi is at least
2t− 2− 2(t− 2) = 2.
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Lemma 3.2.2. Let {v1, v2, . . . , vt} be a set of t distinct columns where each vi comes from
either I or C such that Σti=1vi is weight 1. Then only possible combination is 1 column of
weight t and t − 1 columns of weight 1. Moreover, each column of weight 1, including the
resultant Σti=1vi, should have 1 in the same place as those of weight t column.
Proof. Clearly, if all v′is are weight 1, then Σ
t
i=1vi would be weight t. Now, if at least two v
′
is
are weight t then Σti=1vi can not be weight 1 from Lemma 3.2.1. The condition on position
of 1 is easy to check so we skip the proof.
Remark 3.2.2. Since columns of C have weight t, any column of AC is an addition of t
columns of A. Moreover, every column of A contributes to such tr additions where tr is the
weight of a row of C.
Theorem 3.2.3. If P ∈ Aut(M) with C satisfying condition (II) and (III) then for any
corresponding A, AC can not have a column of weight 1.
Proof. Suppose there is a column (say ac1) of AC with weight 1. As columns of AC are
obtained by adding t columns of A, there exists a set {a1, a2, . . . , at} of t distinct columns
such that Σai = ac1.
From Lemma 3.2.2, one column should be weight t and rest of the columns must be
weight 1. Let a1 be weight t column and a2, a3, . . . , at be weight 1 and each weight 1 column
matches with weight t column.
Now since a1 must be involved in tr such additions (tr ≥ 2), there exists another set
{a1, a′2, a′3, . . . a′t} such that a1 + a′2 + a′3 + · · ·+ a′t = ac2 is another column of AC. As ac2 is
column of AC it must be of weight 1 or weight t.
Observe that ac2 can not be weight 1. Because if ac2 was weight 1, then from Lemma 3.2.2
it should match 1, with a1. The only columns satisfying such condition are a2, a3, . . . , at, ac1.
But ac2 can not be equal to either of those since column of AC can not be equal to any
column of A or any other column of AC, this follows from Remark 3.2.1.
Now only possibility is ac2 has weight t. Now we analyze this possibility in two cases.
Case 1: All a′2, a
′
3, . . . , a
′
t have weight t. This leads to a contradiction as now the columns
in the addition are weight t, all of them come from C. Thus we have one column of C as
sum of other columns of C. Contradiction to condition (II).
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Case 2: There is a column of weight 1 in addition (say a′2). Now we have
a1 + a
′
2 + a
′
3 + · · ·+ a′t = ac2
Therefore, a1 + ac2 + a
′
3 + a
′
4 + · · · + a′t = a′2. Contradiction to Lemma 3.2.1 as a1, ac2
have weight t and a′2 has weight 1.
Thus we have ruled out every possibility for ac2. Hence our assumption that there was a
column of weight 1 in AC is wrong. Hence, every column of AC is weight t.
Corollary 3.2.4. If C satisfies conditions (II),(II) and M = [I|C] then every P ∈ Aut(M)
is a direct sum of permutation matrix of size mp and a permutation matrix of size p that is
P can be expressed as P = P1 ⊕ P2 where P1 is a mp×mp permutation matrix and P2 is a
p× p permutation matrix.
Proof. Since AC has no column of weight 1; A must be permuted to get identity matrix
and AC must be permuted to get C. Thus P permutes first mp columns within themselves
and last k columns within themselves. Therefore, P = P1 ⊕ P2 with corresponding sizes.
Moreover, A = P1
−1 and ACP2 = C.
Lemma 3.2.5. If M satisfies condition (II) and (III) then |Aut(M)| = #(P1,P2) satisfying
P1CP2 = C.
Proof. From corollary 3.2.4; A = P−11 and ACP2 = C. Therefore, P
−1
1 CP2 = C and satisfies
required equation with P1 = P−11 and P2 = P2. Similarly, one can go back to show other side.
Thus, Aut(M) is in one-to-one correspondence with (P1,P2) solutions for P1CP2 = C.
Corollary 3.2.6. If M satisfies condition (II) and (III) then |Aut(M)| = #P2 satisfying
P1CP2 = C.
Proof. Notice that since no two rows of C are identical CP2 are identical as P2 just permutes
columns. Hence there is at most one way to permute rows to get back C. Hence for every P2
there is at most one P1. Since P2 satisfies the equation, we have a unique P1 corresponding
to P2.
So due to corollary 3.2.6 problem of finding size of the automorphism group is reduced
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to finding number of P2 solutions to
P1CP2 = C (3.1)
Here, we state a theorem by Burnside [26, Theorem 3.5B].
Theorem 3.2.7. Burnside Let G be a subgroup of Sym(Fp) containing a p − cycle µ : ξ 7→
ξ + 1. Then G is either 2-transitive or G ≤ AGL1(Fp) where AGL1(Fp) is the affine group
over p.
We use this theorem to prove our main result
Theorem 3.2.8. If M satisfies conditions (I), (II) and (III) then |Aut(M)| ≤ p(p− 1)
Proof. Let G be the set of P2 that satisfy equation (3.1). It is an easy check that G forms
a group. Also we can check that P2 = µ ∈ G as it satisfies the equation (3.1) with P1 being
block diagonal with µ−1 as every block. So using Burnside’s theorem we can say that G is
a subgroup of AGL1(Fp) if it is not doubly transitive and the its size is less that or equal to
p(p− 1). Proof that G is not doubly transitive follows from condition (IV ).
Lemma 3.2.9. If t · tr 6 p− 1 then G is not doubly transitive.
Proof. Let S be the set of x such that there exists a row r in C which contains non-zero
entries at positions 0 and x that is there exists a row r such that r[0] = r[x] = 1. Now clearly
|S| 6 t · tr. Hence, |S| < p and there exists y ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , p− 1} such that y /∈ S. Denote
first row of C by r0. Let x0, y0 be distinct positions such that r0[x0] = r0[y0] = 1. Now one
can notice that no element P2 ∈ G can send (x0, y0) to (0, y) as CP2 needs to have same set
of rows as C. After action of such P2 first row has 1’s at positions 0 and y but no row can
have 1’s at positions 0 and y the reason being y /∈ S. Thus G is not 2 transitive.
Lemma 3.2.10. Minimal degree of G is at least p− 1.
Proof. As P = P1 ⊕ P2 number of points moved by P is greater than or equal to number
of points moved by P2. Now assume P2 fixes at least two points. Then P2 = Ip as P2 ∈
AGL(Fp). And as for every P2 there is at most one corresponding P1, P1 = I(m−1)p making
P = Imp. Thus non identity P can not have corresponding P2 fixing more than one point
and hence every non identity P moves at least p− 1 points.
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Algorithm 2 An algorithm that generates required generator matrix
1: procedure Generate C(p,m, tr)
2: Available set = [0, 1, . . . , p− 1]
3: A = [ ]
4: repeat m times
{
5: while size of Current set ≤ tr do
6: randomly choose α1 ∈ Available set
7: Current set.append[α1]
8: remove α1 from Available Set
9: for (α2, α3) ∈ Current set ∪ A do
10: remove α2 + α3 − α1 modulo p from Available set
11: end for
12: end while
13: A.append (Current State)
}
14: construct circulant Ci having A[i] as its first column
15: return C = Stack [C0, C1, . . . , Cm−1]
16: end procedure
We will now prove correctness of the algorithm. We claim that output of the algorithm
is a C satisfying condition (III). Let A = {αj} denote positions such that c0[αj] = 1 where
c0 is the first column of C.
Lemma 3.2.11. Let A′ = {α′j} denote positions such that cN [α′j] = 1 where cN denotes the
N + 1 th column of C then {αj +N mod p | αj ∈ A} = {α′j | α′j ∈ A′}.
Lemma 3.2.12. If condition (III) is not satisfied by C then there exists α1, α2, α3, α4 such
that α4 = α1 + α3 − α2 mod p such that α1, α2 belong to the same circulant Ci and α3, α4
belong to the same circulant Cj
1.
Proof. Without loss of generality we can assume that column c0 and column cN have more
than one overlaps. So there exists α1 such that c0 [α1] = cN [α1] = 1. Now from second
equality and above lemma α1 = α2+N mod p for some α2 ∈ A . Similarly second overlap will
give you α3 = α4+N mod p. Solving both the equations we get α4 = α1+α3−α2 mod p.
Our algorithm iteratively constructs circulants C0, C1, . . . , Cm−1 so that α4 6= α1+α3−α2.
In this way we ensure that C generated as an output of algorithm satisfies condition (III).
1Ci can be same as Cj that is it is possible that i = j where the case represents both the overlaps
happening in the same circulant
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We end this chapter by showing how to achieve other conditions. Condition (I) is trivial
as we just need to choose a prime p. We now move towards condition (II). By Lemma 3.1.2
we know that Cp is isomorphic to direct product of two rings. First part Fq [x](x−1) is a field as
(x− 1) is irreducible. So to ensure that image in this ring is non-zero we just have to ensure
that weight of circulant is odd. So we get our first condition as tr should be odd. For the
second part of the product we use following lemma.
Lemma 3.2.13. If 2 is a primitive root modulo p then Φp(x) is irreducible in F2 [x].
Proof of this can be found in standard number theory text. So to make the second part
a field we need to choose p such that 2 is primitive. One of the ways to do this is choose
p = 4q+ 1 such that both p and q are prime. For condition (IV ) notice that t = m · tr which
gives us t · tr = tr2 ·m. So we can satisfy condition (IV ) by choosing tr 6
√
p
m
.
In conclusion, we can generate a matrix C satisfying required conditions by running
algorithm for prime p such that 2 is primitive mod p and choosing odd tr less than
√
p
m
and
thus we can construct m−1
m
codes with small automorphism group and minimal degree at
least p− 1.
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Chapter 4
Quantum Secure Niederreiter Variant
This chapter is based on work done in [27]
4.1 Introduction
In chapter 2 we mentioned a way to ensure security of cryptosystem against quantum Fourier
sampling. But before going there, we describe our variant and briefly go over its classical
security. Our variant is based on Quasi-cyclic codes over F2l of rate m−1m . The relevant
definitions about Quasi-cyclic codes are in section 3.1 and more details are in [23].
4.1.1 Description of our Niederreiter cryptosystem
Description of the parity check matrix used for the proposed Niederreiter cryp-
tosystem Recall that we are talking about m−1
m
quasi-cyclic codes over F2l . For the cryp-
tosystem to be quantum-secure the parity check matrix H for the [n = mp, k = (m− 1)p, d],
m−1
m
quasi-cyclic code should satisfy the following conditions:
I Integers m, p, such that p is a prime and m is bounded above by a polynomial in p.
II The matrix H is of size p×mp over F2l .
31
III The matrix H is of the form [C0 = I |C1 |C2 | . . . |Cm−1 ], where each Ci is a circulant
matrix of size p. Each Ci for i > 0 should contain an element from a proper extension
of F2. Furthermore, we denote the matrix H as [ I |C ] where C is the concatenation
of the circulant matrices Ci, i > 0.
IV We define TH =
{
P1 ∈ Sp | ∃P2 ∈ Sp(m−1) such that P1CP2 = C
}
, where Sn is the sym-
metric group acting on n letters. It is easy to see that TH is a permutation group
action on p letters. The condition we impose on H is that TH is not 2-transitive.
V No two columns of C are identical.
4.2 Classical Attacks
In this section we briefly go over the generic classical attacks against McEliece and Nieder-
reiter cryptosystems. We also mention some attacks exploiting the circulant structures in
the keys. Interestingly, Li et al. [12, Section III] proved that both McEliece and Niederreiter
cryptosystems are equivalent in terms of classical security. The proof follows from the fact
that the encryption equation for one can be reduced to the other. This implies the equiva-
lence of security of both the cryptosystems for attacks that try to extract the plaintext from
a ciphertext.
Most generic attacks over algebraic code based cryptosystems are information set de-
coding attacks(ISD). Two most popular ways of implementing ISD attacks are by Lee and
Brickell [9] and Stern [8]. As mentioned by Baldi et al. [10] ISD attacks are the best known
attacks with the least work factor as far as classical cryptanalysis is considered. Hence these
work factors are considered as security levels for a McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems.
The basic idea behind one of the attacks was suggested by McEliece himself. Lee and
Brickell [9] improved the attack and added an important verification step where attacker
confirms that recovered message is the correct one. In this case, we are dealing with a
McEliece cryptosystem over a [n, k] linear code. The strategy is based on repeatedly selecting
k bits at random from a n-bit ciphertext in hope that none of the selected bits are part of
the error. Similar attacks can also be implemented over Niederreiter cryptosystems. Lee and
Brickell also provided a closed-form equation for complexity of the attack. As our system is
based on (n = mp, k = (m− 1)p, dmin = 2E + 1) code the expression for minimal work factor
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(with α = β = 1 as taken by Lee and Brickell) takes the following form
Wmin = W2 = T2
(
(m− 1)3p3 + (m− 1)pN2
)
where T2 =
1
Q0 +Q1 +Q2
and Qi =
(E
i
) (
n−E
k−i
)
/
(
n
k
)
with N2 = 1 + k +
(
k
2
)
.
In Table 4.1 we present numerical data for work factor for different values of parameters.
Recently, Aylaj et al. [24] developed an algorithm to construct stack-circulant codes with
high error correcting capacity which makes the proposed Niederreiter cryptosystem much
more promising.
Other ISD attacks are based on a strategy given by Stern. To recover the intentional error
vector e in a McEliece cryptosystem such strategies use an extension code C ′′ generated by
generator matrix M ′′ =
[
M ′
x
]
. Bernstein et al. [11] later improved this attack. Probability
of success and work factor for Stern’s attack is described in [28]. In the Table 4.1 we also
provide probability of success for parameters l = 16 and Aw ≈ n− k. Both the parameters
can be optimized further to obtain the least work factor but not much variation is seen as
we change any of these parameters. With such low probabilities, it is clear that the work
factor for Stern’s attack is worse than the Lee-Brickell attack. Even when one considers
improvements suggested by Bernstein et al. [11], Lee-Brickell’s [9] attack seems to outperform
the attack by Bernstein et al. as it produces speedup up to 12 times and hence the security
of the system against the Lee-Brickell attack should be considered the security of the system.
Key sizes should be devised according to that.
Another attack worth mentioning for quasi-cyclic codes is the attack on the dual code.
This attack works only if the dual code has really low weight codewords and is often en-
countered only when sparse parity check matrices are involved. For example, McEliece with
QC-LDPC [10]. Such attacks can easily be stopped by choosing codes that do not have low
weight codewords. From the work of Aylaj et al. [24] this can be achieved.
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4.3 Quantum security
After this discussion on classical security we now move towards quantum-security of the
proposed McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems which is one of the major goal of this
chapter. Before moving towards quantum security we recall definitions and theorem by
Dinh, Moore and Russell.
Definition 4.3.1. Aut(M) = {P ∈ Sn such that there exists A ∈ GLk(Fq), AMP = M}
Definition 4.3.2. The minimal degree of a G 6 Sn acting on set of n symbols is defined to
be minimum number of elements moved by a non-identity element of the group G.
Definition 4.3.3. Consider a k × n matrix M , we define TM for matrix M = [Ik|M∗] as
TM = {P1 ∈ Sk such that there exists P2 ∈ Sn−k with P1M∗P2 = M∗ }
Theorem 4.3.1. [21, Theorem 4]: Assume qk
2 6 nan for some constant 0 < a < 1/4. Let
m be the minimal degree of the automorphism group Aut(M). Then for sufficiently large n,
the subgroup K, DK 6 O(|K|2e−δm), where δ > 0 is a constant.
The idea behind security of the system is when distinguishability of the hidden subgroup
K denoted as Dk becomes less than log
−ω(1) |G|, quantum Fourier sampling can not give us
the hidden subgroup and hence an attacker can not find a scrambler permutation pair.
4.3.1 Proof of indistinguishability of the hidden subgroup
We prove indistinguishability in a sequence of lemmas.
Lemma 4.3.2. Let P ∈ Aut(H) then P = P1 ⊕ P2 where P1 is a block of size p and P2 is a
block of size (m− 1)p and P1 ⊕ P2 is a block diagonal matrix of size mp×mp with the top
block P1 and the bottom block P2.
Proof. Let P ∈ Aut(H), from the definition of automorphism there is an A such that AHP =
H. This implies that
A [ I |C ]P = [A |AC ]P = [ I |C ] .
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As action of right multiplication by a permutation matrix permute columns, the above
equality shows that [A |AC ] has same columns as [ I |C ] possibly in different order. Now
since every column of C contains an entry from a proper extension of Fq, no column of A can
be column of C. This forces A to have same columns as I and AC to have same columns as
that of C. Hence P permutes first p columns within themselves and last (m− 1)p columns
in themselves. Hence every P ∈ Aut(H) can be broken into P1 ⊕ P2 so that P1 acts on I
and P2 acts on C.
An obvious corollary follows:
Corollary 4.3.3. If P ∈ Aut(H) then the corresponding A ∈ Sk.
The next lemma is central to quantum-security. It gives us a way to move from H to C by
noting, the P1 from the P ∈ Aut(H) is actually a member of TH.
Lemma 4.3.4. The cardinality of Aut(H) is the cardinality of the set {(P1, P2)} that satisfy
P1CP2 = C where H = [ I |C ] as defined earlier.
Proof. The proof follows from the fact, if P belongs to Aut(H), then P = P1 ⊕ P2. Then
A [ I |C ]P = [ I |C ] translates into A [ I |C ] (P1 ⊕ P2) = [ I |C ]. Keeping in mind the
block diagonal nature of P , it follows that [AIP1 |ACP2 ] = [ I |C ]. Then A = P−11 and
P−11 CP2 = C. This proves the lemma.
The next lemma proves that for each P1 there is at most one P2.
Lemma 4.3.5. Cardinality of the set {(P1, P2) that satisfy P1CP2 = C} equals |TH|.
Proof. Recall that TH = {P1 that satisfy P1CP2 = C}. So it suffices to show that for every
P1 there is at most one P2. Since no two columns of C are identical, no two columns of P1C
are identical. Hence, there is at most one way to re-order them to get back C. Thus for
every P1 there is at most one P2.
Theorem 4.3.6 (Burnside [26, Theorem 3.5B]). Let G be a subgroup of Sym(Fp) containing
a p-cycle µ : ξ 7→ ξ + 1. Then G is either 2-transitive or G ≤ AGL1(Fp) where AGL1(Fp) is
the affine group over p.
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We prove a theorem on the size of the Automorphism group of H.
Theorem 4.3.7. If H satisfies conditions I,II and III then |Aut(H)| 6 p(p− 1).
Proof. From Lemma 4.3.4 and Lemma 4.3.5, the group Aut(H) has same size as TH. It is
now easy to check that the circulant matrix µ with first row [0, 1, 0, . . . , 0] of size p belongs
to TH. The corresponding P2 will be a block diagonal (m − 1)p matrix with blocks of size
p and each consisting of µ−1. Now notice that the circulant matrix µ corresponds to the
p-cycle ξ 7→ ξ + 1. By our condition III, TH is not 2-transitive. Now by Burnside’s theorem
TH ≤ AGL1(Fp). Thus |Aut(H)| 6 p(p− 1).
After this bound on the size of the Automorphism group we move towards the minimal
degree of the Automorphism group.
Lemma 4.3.8. The minimal degree of Aut(H) is bounded below by p− 1.
Proof. Notice that any P ∈ Aut(H) = P1⊕P2. By the twist, from P ∈ Aut(H) to P−11 ∈ TH,
it is easy to see that P1 ∈ AGLk(Fq). Then P1(x) = ax+ b (mod q) for some a, b ∈ Fq. If P
fixes two distinct points, then a = 1 and b = 0 is the only possible solution. This corresponds
to the identity element and thus a non-identity element can not fix more that one point. So
minimal degree of Aut(H) is bounded below by p− 1.
We now prove the main theorem of this chapter.
Theorem 4.3.9. Let p be a prime and m a positive integer bounded above by a polynomial
in p, such that, p ≤ 1
4
m (logm+ log p). Then the subgroup K (Equation 2.3) defined above
is indistinguishable.
Proof. We will use Theorem 4.3.1 in this proof. First note, the minimal degree is bounded
below by p − 1. Now it is well known that |K| = 2|H0|2 and |H0| = |Aut(H)| × |Fix(H)|.
We have shown that |Aut(H)| ≤ p(p− 1) and it is easy to see that |Fix(H)| = 1. Putting all
these together, we see that |K|2e−δp ≤ 4p8e−δp for some positive constant δ. However, from
the bound on the size of m, it is obviously true that 4p8e−δp ≤ (mp log (mp))−ω(1) for large
enough p.
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Now, if p ≤ am (logm+ log p), then p2 ≤ amp (logm+ log p) which gives 2p2 ≤ (mp)amp
for 0 < a < 1
4
. This satisfies the premise of Theorem 4.3.1 and hence K is indistinguishable.
4.4 Construction of the required parity check matrix
Now we address the last question about the proposed Niederreiter cryptosystem, how to
construct a matrix H satisfying conditions I, II, III and IV? Clearly, conditions I, II and
III are trivial to set up and deserve no special attention. We suggest a particular way for
construction of parity check matrix H so that condition IV is satisfied. It should be noted
that there may be other ways to meet condition IV as well.
Choose a pair of distinct elements a, b ∈ Fql . Now construct H such that C1 contains
both a and b exactly once in each column and no other Ci contains both a and b. We restate
this condition as our condition IV′. We could have replaced C1 by any other Ci for i > 1
and the proof remains the same. For sake of simplicity we stick with C1.
IV′ Two distinct elements a, b ∈ Fql occurs as entries of C1 exactly once in each column and
no other Ci contain both a and b.
Lemma 4.4.1. If the matrix H satisfies IV′, it also satisfies IV.
Proof. Let P1 ∈ TH. From P1CP2 = C it follows that P1C should have the same set of
columns as C but possibly in a different order. Let α denote the row of a in the first column
of C1 and β denote the row of b in the same column. Now notice that every column in C that
contains both a and b contains them such that difference between rows of a and b is α − β
mod p where p is the size of each circulant matrix. Now let σ ∈ TH such that it sends β to
α and α to β. It then follows from the fact that p is a odd prime, α = β which contradicts
our assumption. Hence, TH is not 2 transitive.
Condition V can be easily satisfied using brute force and other means and this completes
the construction of a parity check matrix H satisfying I, II, III, IV and V and hence, a
Niederreiter cryptosystem that resists quantum Fourier sampling is found.
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Algorithm 3 An algorithm that generates required parity check matrix
1: procedure Generate H(p,m)
2: choose a, b ∈ F×
2l
3: generate an array v of length p− 2 with entries from F2l − {a, b}
4: Construct an array c1 by concatenating array [a, b] with the array v
5: randomly permute entries within c1
6: Let I denote the array of length p; I = [1, 0, 0, . . . , 0]
7: vector list = [I, c0]
8: Let R denote the right shift operator
9: construct an array x of length p over F2l
10: while vector list has length less than m do
11: for y ∈ vector list do
12: for 0 6 i 6 n− 1 do
13: if Ri(x) = y then
14: choose next x
15: else
16: add x in the vector list
17: choose next x
18: end if
19: end for
20: end for
21: end while
22: for vi ∈ vector list ; 0 6 i 6 m− 1 do
23: Construct a circulant matrix Ci with v as its first column
24: end for
25: return parity check matrix H = Array[C0, C1, . . . , Cm−1]
26: end procedure
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4.5 Advantages of the proposed cryptosystem
One of the prime advantages of our proposed cryptosystem is quantum-security. Apart
from that it has high transmission rate which translated into high encryption rate. Current
McEliece cryptosystem built on Goppa codes has transmission rate of about 0.52. For a
McEliece cryptosystem its rate is same as that of the transmission rate of the underlying
code and is k
n
. Niederreiter cryptosystems have slightly different rates due to difference in
their encryption algorithm. For a general cryptosystem its encryption rate or information
rate can be defined as follows [29]:
Let S(C) denote possible number of plaintext and T (C) denote possible number of ci-
phertexts then information rate of the system is defined by
R(C) = log (S(C))
log (T (C)) .
This information rate can be viewed as amount of information contained in one bit of ci-
phertext.
Our proposed Niederreiter cryptosystem have encryption rate on the higher side. This
gives our variant an edge over once those constructed on classical Goppa codes or with GRS
codes (generalized Reed-Solomon codes).
As discussed before another problem with McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems is
large key size. Circulant matrices seems like a good choice when it comes to key-sizes.
Matrices are 2-dimensional objects but circulant matrices behave like a 1-dimensional object
as they can be described by their first row. Though this circulant structure is lost in public
key due to the scrambler-permutation pair, the size of the key still remains smaller than
the conventional Niederreiter cryptosystem. Our system is slightly better than original
Niederreiter cryptosystem because of the less number of rows in the public key matrices.
With p = 101, this number is less than one-tenth of the original Niederreiter cryptosystem.
Though there are two factors that increase size of matrices in our variant compared to
original McEliece, one, our matrices have large number of columns; and two, our system is
based on extension field Fql which makes the effective size of the matrix l times compared
to McEliece which is based on F2. However, in most cases due to very less number of rows
the net result indicates that our system requires shorter keys than original McEliece. For
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instance, at 80-bit security with p = 101 and l = 3 our keys are almost half of the keys
corresponding to original McEliece at same security level. While at 256-bit security level
with p = 211, t = 40 and l = 3 our system key size of about 1
4
th
of the original McEliece.
Table 4.1: Parameters for the proposed Niederreiter cryptosystem
Security p t mc mQ m Probability Public Key Size Rate
in bits of success No. rows No. cols
80-bits
101
15 17 35 35 2−132 101 3535 0.60
20 9 35 35 2−190 101 3535 0.77
211
35 4 62 62 2−398 211 13082 0.71
40 3 62 62 2−465 211 13082 0.80
100-bits
101
15 40 35 40 2−136 101 4040 0.61
20 17 35 35 2−190 101 3535 0.77
211
35 5 62 62 2−398 211 13082 0.71
40 5 62 62 2−465 211 13082 0.80
120-bits
101
15 95 35 95 2−171 101 9595 0.67
20 32 35 35 2−190 101 3535 0.77
211
35 8 62 62 2−398 211 13082 0.71
40 6 62 62 2−465 211 13082 0.80
128-bits
101
15 134 35 134 2−184 101 13534 0.70
20 42 35 42 2−199 101 4242 0.79
211
35 9 62 62 2−398 211 13082 0.71
40 7 62 62 2−465 211 13082 0.80
256-bits 211
35 98 62 98 2−443 211 20678 0.75
20 55 62 62 2−465 211 13082 0.80
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Chapter 5
Results and Conclusion
This thesis looks into two different variants of McEliece cryptosystem and corresponding
NP-hard scrambler permutation problem from the point of view of security against quantum
computers. In chapter 3 we attempted a problem of combinatorial optimization where the
underlying code needs to have small automorphism group and large minimal degree so that
we get |Aut(M)|4e−δ(m) 6 log−ω(1)|G|. This does not produce a McEliece cryptosystem as
the premise of the theorem for quantum security requires qk
2 6 nαn for some 0 < α < 1
4
,
the problem still is mathematically strong enough to deserve some attention. We provide a
cryptosystem satisfying suggested bounds on automorphism group and minimal degree along
with the algorithm to construct parity check matrices for this variant. It would be interesting
to see if one can relax the requirement qk
2 6 nαn so that we get a quantum secure McEliece
over quasi-cyclic codes. Another direction of improvement could be refining condition for
the construction. In particular, if condition (III) can be relaxed it can increase the class of
codes significantly.
In chapter 4 we give a Niederreiter variant that is classically and quantum secure against
current known attacks. In particular, we show that for our system the hidden subgroup
coming from natural reduction of corresponding scrambler-permutation problem is indistin-
guishable by quantum Fourier sampling. We also show that our system has higher encryption
rate and shorter keys compared to classical McEliece systems. One of the important problem
that needs to be addressed is finding QCCs that fit the suggested parameter size. It would
be interesting to see if the system remains classically secure if we use sparse keys. It is clear
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that the system remains secure against quantum computers as the group structure for the
system remains the same. This is important because it could reduce key sizes substantially.
Other than classical security, the real question is, can we construct codes using sparse par-
ity check matrices simultaneously satisfying required conditions (I) − (V ) and retain error
correction capacity of the system as par suggested parameters? Another problem of interest
could be optimizing values of p, t, l so that we get high rates and lower sized keys.
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